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spread of Islamic hegemony across 
not just the land but also the sea.
In a world where information has not 
always been easy to come by, Konstam’s 
small but highly esteemed book does 
justice to the world of competing 
Arab-Byzantine interests. It covers the 
specifics of the fierce at-sea dueling that 
went on within the larger competition 
that spread over a sea claimed by both 
Byzantine Greek and Arab powers, 
anticipating by half a millennium the 
Ottoman conflict that would include 
both the fall of Constantinople and 
the ensuing battle of Lepanto.
PATRICK HUNT
Mayday: The Decline of American Naval Suprem-
acy, by Seth Cropsey. New York: Overlook, 2014. 
348 pages. $29.95 (paperback $17.95).
Mayday is an extended argument for 
the expansion of the U.S. naval fleet to 
confront Chinese ambitions in the South 
China Sea, secure U.S. global interests, 
and ensure America’s future as a great 
power. The author, Mr. Seth Cropsey, 
has considerable experience in defense 
and government, having served as a 
Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy in 
two administrations, in addition to other 
roles; he is associated with various think 
tanks. He demonstrates an in-depth and 
well-developed understanding of the 
strategic issues the Navy faces as he  
traces the development of U.S. sea power,  
assesses its current state, and examines a 
number of proposals before offering his 
own prescription for the Navy’s future.
In many ways this book is a reapplica-
tion of pre–World War I naval theory 
espoused by the Naval War College’s 
own Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. The 
author uses Mahanian thought exten-
sively in his analysis of the historical 
development of American sea power 
into its current incarnation, explaining 
that, because of the U.S. Navy’s current 
build rates and mismatched strategies, 
it is on a downward trajectory that 
will result in the loss of U.S. sea power. 
This, in turn, will result in a loss of U.S. 
influence and global stability worldwide. 
This channeling of Mahan is generally 
well executed, with one exception: at 
several points within the text, Mahan’s 
equation of naval strength with the 
size of the national shipping fleet is 
referenced, without a solid explana-
tion of how that relates to the current 
U.S. reliance on foreign carriers. The 
proposed repeal of the Jones Act (which 
mandates the use of U.S.-produced, 
-flagged, and -crewed carriers for cargo 
moved between U.S. ports) appears 
almost out of nowhere, and while 
a repeal definitely would improve 
competition and lower shipping costs, 
Mr. Cropsey fails to explain how this 
would be beneficial to the Navy or assist 
in correcting the strategic issues it faces.
The chapters on China’s naval expansion 
and the ongoing gap between the U.S. 
Navy’s force requirements and the 
number of hulls that its shipbuilding 
plan and budget can deliver are very 
informative and well reasoned. When 
observed through the Mahanian lens 
that Mr. Cropsey provides, it is not 
difficult to see how the People’s Libera-
tion Army Navy has embraced the idea 
that naval power is key to China’s ability 
to influence the region and secure its 
interests from the African littorals 
to the deep waters of the Pacific.
The book runs a bit thin in the delivery 
of economic arguments regarding 
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the American deficit, national debt, 
and entitlements, and the occasional 
departures into partisan rhetoric do 
not really serve the overall thrust of the 
book. Some of the arguments it contains 
are inconsistent or undeveloped. An ex-
ample is the suggestion to build smaller, 
single-mission hulls, which is followed 
later by a diametrically opposite 
recommendation to build multimission 
frigates with antiair, antisubmarine, 
and antisurface warfare capabilities. 
Additionally, his proposal to relegate 
much of the Army to National Guard 
or Reserve status is probably politically 
infeasible because of the dire effects this 
would have on the communities around 
major Army bases. All that aside, it is 
difficult to disagree with the fundamen-
tal tenets of Mayday—that a sufficiently 
sized and equipped Navy is crucial 
for our continued national security 
and the maintenance of international 
order—and on these bases his arguments 
for a naval expansion are sound.
Mayday provides an excellent case for 
reversing the piecemeal downsizing of 
the Navy, a return to pragmatic platform 
design, and consistent funding of a 
shipbuilding program to deliver and 
maintain a fleet sized to secure our 
interests and achieve our international 
objectives. Although the quote is not 
mentioned specifically, this book recalls 
President George Washington’s observa-
tion in his letter of 15 November 1781 
to the Marquis de Lafayette: “[W]ithout 
a decisive naval force we can do nothing 
definitive, and with it, everything 
honorable and glorious.” Mr. Cropsey’s 
recommendations are pragmatic and 
worth consideration by senior Navy 
leadership and policy makers alike.
JOSH HEIVLY
Realpolitik: A History, by John Bew. New York: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 2015. 408 pages. $27.95.
John Bew, a historian at King’s 
College London, provides the first 
comprehensive intellectual history of the 
often-misunderstood term Realpolitik. 
Drawing on the experience gained 
from his acclaimed biography of Lord 
Castlereagh, the Napoleonic-era British 
foreign secretary, Bew traces Realpolitik 
from its obscure, nineteenth-century 
origins in revolutionary Germany to the 
term’s use and misuse in contemporary 
Anglo-American foreign policy debates. 
Scholars and practitioners seeking to 
gain a more nuanced understanding of 
the evolution of Western foreign policy 
thinking over the last century, particu-
larly before 1945, would be well advised 
to consider Bew’s compelling narrative.
In the often-glib foreign policy 
discussions that characterize public 
understanding of the discipline’s key 
terms and points of contention, realism 
is often supposed to be interchange-
able with Realpolitik. Bew’s greatest 
contribution is his voluminous research 
into the term’s early history, beginning 
with the 1853 book Foundations of 
Realpolitik by the little-known German 
philosopher Ludwig von Rochau. This 
original formulation, distinct from 
later uses in both Germany and the 
Anglosphere, was a creature of its time 
and place: a disunited Germany torn 
between the liberal impulses of the 
1848 revolutions and the conservatism 
of its traditional ruling class, as 
personified by Otto von Bismarck.
Rochau’s Realpolitik was not an ideol-
ogy at all; it was a lens for viewing the 
political circumstances of Germany’s 
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